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A Re-evaluation of Generalship
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds
and Major-General George Kitching
in Normandy 1944
Angelo Caravaggio

M

ajor-General George Kitching was General
Officer C o m m a n d i n g 4 t h C a n a d i a n
Armoured Division from February until August
1944. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds,
commander of 2nd Canadian Corps to which
4th Canadian Armoured Division belonged,
relieved Kitching of command on 21 August,
ostensibly for lack of leadership. The story of
Major-General Kitching and 4th Canadian
Armoured Division in Normandy has so far not
been portrayed in an especially positive light.
Most scholarship, including the official history
of the Canadian Army, accepts that Simonds was
justified in relieving Kitching from command.
Criticism from contemporary American and
British commanders, repeated by subsequent
historians, claimed that attacks by 2nd Canadian
Corps, with the object of closing the Falaise Gap,
were not pressed forward with sufficient resolve
and thereby resulted in the escape of some
quarter million German soldiers. 1 The "poor"
performance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division
in general, and the s u p p o s e d lacklustre
command performance of Kitching in particular,
have been convenient explanations for this
failure. Simonds viewed the case as one of
leadership potential that was never achieved by
Kitching. The expectation was that the Canadians
should have been more successful in Operations
"Totalize" and "Tractable" and that 4th Canadian
Armoured Division, as the spearhead for the
Canadian advance, should have closed the
Falaise Gap sooner. John English even goes so
far as to state that the lacklustre performance
of the Canadian army in Normandy laid squarely
at the feet of the divisional commanders. 2

Is this assessment valid? George Kitching
tried to do his duty as a general. He tried to win
the battles he was ordered to fight and he tried
to prepare his men as best he could for the
battles they would have to fight in Normandy.
He was prevented from accomplishing both
objectives by his superior Guy Simonds. Taking
a more multi-disciplinary approach to the
question reveals that the command relationship
between Simonds and Kitching was beset with
serious problems. The personal performance of
Kitching as General Officer Commanding 4th
Canadian Armoured Division was a direct result
of being forced to operate in what Ross Pigeau
and Carol McCann describe as a compromised
command environment and the resulting
emotional and physical strain that this situation
placed on him personally. 3 This command
environment, created by Simonds, was derived
from the corps commander's mistrust of his
subordinate divisional commanders after his
failed attacks of July. Simonds decided he would
maintain greater control and in so doing,
stripped his divisional commanders of their
c o m m a n d a u t h o r i t y . Kitching was not
responsible for the resulting compromised
command environment, but he was forced to
command his division within it until 21 August.
Lack of sleep, combined with the stresses of
sustained combat and the high casualties in the
August 1944 battles, sapped what was left of
Kitching's capacity to command effectively at the
divisional level under Simonds.
J a m e s Jay Carafano, in his book After
D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy
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Major-General George Kitching and Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds.

Breakout, observes:" We do not write the history
of what happened but the history of the records
that remain." 4 The statement underscores the
limitations of writing operational and tactical
history from the existing primary source
material, which in many cases is woefully
deficient. Most war diaries of the units and
regiments of 4th Canadian Armoured Division
are incomplete and in some cases, totally
missing. The state of 4th Canadian Armoured
Division's war diary itself is of particular
concern. It appears that existing documents for
July and August were rebuilt after the fact. The
incompleteness of the July and August 1944
diaries when compared to the diaries before and
after those months and the fact that MajorGeneral Harry Foster signed off the diary for July
1944 are somewhat worrisome. Foster took
command of 4th Canadian Armoured Division
on 21 August after Kitching was relieved of
command. Kitching had signed 4th Canadian
Armoured Division war diary entries from
February 1944, when he assumed command, to
June 1944 and his signature should therefore
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss4/2

have appeared on the July 1944 entry. The
crucial documents that would have shed light
on the activities, conversations, and orders by
Kitching are the armoured command vehicle
logs, but these are missing entirely. Without these
logs, it is almost impossible to track Kitching's
personal activities. Donald Graves asked
Kitching about these logs in an interview, and
Kitching seemed surprised that they were not
available, thus implying that they did exist at
one time. The existing p r i m a r y s o u r c e s
documenting 4th Canadian Armoured Division's
activities during August 1944 are neither
consistent nor reliable.
Most secondary sources support Simonds
and his decision to relieve Kitching. In fact, other
than one paragraph at the end of Chapter 14, in
his book Mud and Green Fields, Kitching fails
to come to his own defence.5 Surprisingly, the
battles of "Totalize" and "Tractable" are not
discussed in any great detail inside the book.
Kitching told me during a 1990 tour of the
Normandy battles that the manuscript for his
2
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memoirs was actually much longer than that
actually published. Given Kitching's close
association with Simonds and his actions once
relieved of command, Kitching probably would
have not criticised Simonds in any way had there
been further discussions of these battles.
Kitching receives timid support in Reginald Roy's
book 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, which
provides a detailed account of the Canadian
actions and Kitching's troubles. 6 Nonetheless,
Roy leaves readers to decide whether or not
Kitching was fairly treated. Donald Graves' South
Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War and
J o h n M a r t e i n s o n ' s The Royal Canadian
Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History have
cast different lights on the events of August 1944,
and to some extent, on what happened to
Kitching. 7 They have u n c o v e r e d c e r t a i n
fragments of information, which become
important in this reassessment. Notwithstanding, historians have generally accepted
Simonds' dismissal of Kitching without question
or any detailed assessment of Kitching's side of
the story. Any reconsideration of the command
relationship between Simonds and Kitching,
resulting in the latter's dismissal, requires
careful and critical reading of the war diaries
from 1st Canadian Army and 2nd Canadian
Corps in light of new information presented by
Graves and Marteinson.
Among the principal problems with the
l i t e r a t u r e as a whole is t h e seemingly
indiscriminant interchanging of the names of
Simonds and Kitching in describing 4th
Canadian Armoured Division's battles during
August. In certain texts, Simonds is credited for
giving a specific order, while in
others it was Kitching who gave the
order. An example is the decision to
re-route 4th Canadian Armoured
Division units over a secondary
bridge when initial attempts to
exploit beyond Damblainville failed
on 17 August. The actual decision
to change the plan and redirect the
attack speaks highly of the ability of
that commander to assess

accurately and react properly to the conditions
on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the existing
literature leaves a confused picture as to who
actually made the decision to reroute the 4th
Canadian Armoured Brigade's forces. The most
probable scenario is that Kitching recommended
the change and Simonds approved. What is clear
from the literature is that Kitching, as a
divisional commander, lacked the latitude to
change a Simonds plan once it had been issued,
even when it involved movement within his own
divisional boundaries.
Another problem with the accepted history
is the lack of a proper measurement tool to
evaluate the command environment within
which Kitching a n d the other C a n a d i a n
divisional c o m m a n d e r s u n d e r S i m o n d s
operated. In order to offer a valid assessment of
Kitching as a commander, an examination of his
c o m m a n d e n v i r o n m e n t is e s s e n t i a l . A
measurement tool for assessing or quantifying
a command environment has only recently
become available with development of the Pigeau/
McCann Command and Control model. 8 The
model provides a workable definition of
command and control that can then be used to
guide policy and doctrine. The model represents
a rich tool for the assessment of commanders
and their command environment. It includes two
components that are critical to this evaluation,
the Command, Authority Responsibility (CAR)
space and what is referred to as the Balanced
Command Envelop (BCE).
The model examines the relationship
between competency, authority and

The Pigeau/McCann Command
and Control model.
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responsibility within a three dimensional space
resulting in a four-quadrant matrix. The four
quadrants are called dangerous command,
maximal (balanced) c o m m a n d , m i n i m a l
(balanced) command and ineffectual command.
The q u a d r a n t of specific concern in this
investigation is ineffectual command. Within
ineffectual command lies a state known as
compromised command. Compromised
command is characterized as an acceptance of
high levels of responsibility on the part of the
commander without commensurately high levels
of authority being given. Responsibility has been
taken; however, power over resources has not

Compromised Command Environment.

been assigned nor has any clear mandate to act
been authorized.
Ineffectual command undermines the very
purpose of a military. Without authority, a
commander is powerless to accomplish the
mission properly, yet can feel responsible for not
having done so. Without sufficient authority,
commanders are seriously compromised in their
missions, and worse, the individuals filling the
command positions are at a t r e m e n d o u s
psychological d i s a d v a n t a g e . 9 This set of
circumstances provides an accurate description
of the position in which Kitching found himself
during the latter half of August 1944. The Pigeau/
McCann model predicts the compromised

command environment and details the likely
r e s u l t s of the e x i s t e n c e of t h i s type of
environment. In the case of Kitching, the model
proves amazingly accurate.
The last element of the m e a s u r e m e n t
equation is success. Success in battle is usually
the primary measurement tool for a battlefield
commander. But what is the definition of success
and more particularly, success at what cost? As
Jack Granatstein states in The Generals, even
good commanders cannot be expected to win
every battle, and since Canada possessed few
experienced commanders, those who were
removed from command tended to be replaced
by someone less experienced. 10 General Omar
Bradley, in his book A Soldier's Story, states
that during the Argentan-Falaise battle, General
George Patton measured his successes in miles
gained, while General Courtney Hodges
measured success in enemy dead. 11 Kitching's
measurement tool was time, namely the time
required to close the Falaise Gap.
Lack of Allied success in June and July,
combined with the doctrinal preference for setpiece attacks, shaped the command paradigm
that Simonds would establish for the August
battles. Each of the set piece battles of June and
July failed to meet stated objectives; yet,
Simonds clung to this style of command and
perpetuated it during the month of August with
the same results. It appears that the most
important lesson Simonds took away from the
setbacks of June and July, particularly after
Operation "Spring," was that he could not trust
the tactical acumen of his Canadian infantry
divisional commanders. 12 Simonds' solution was
to exercise tighter control in future operations.
This tighter control led to the detailed operation
plans for the upcoming Corps operations
"Totalize" and "Tractable."
Bill McAndrew has described the Simonds
command environment as one where higher
headquarters produced detailed plans for lower
formations and units to implement. These plans
often resulted in centralized planning, control
at the highest level, staff management of the
battlefield, reliance on indirect fire support, little
consideration to the concept of maneuver, and
cautious exploitation. This formula usually
resulted in units attacking an enemy's strength
rather than trying to outflank them. There was

8
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little room for flexibility, initiative, originality, or
the modification of the plan to meet the emerging
demands of the battlefield.13 If the plan failed,
the blame was always pushed downwards to the
units and commanders involved. In some
respects, fighting the enemy became secondary
to executing the plan. Simonds typically believed
that his plans were never the problem. Rather,
it was the execution of his plans by his
s u b o r d i n a t e s t h a t r e s u l t e d i n failure.
Nonetheless, a British report discussed the
problematical nature of the plans and their
implementation:
Our own tactical methods are thorough and
methodical b u t slow a n d c u m b e r s o m e . In
consequence, our troops fight well in defence
and our set-piece attacks are usually successful,
but it is not unfair to say that through lack of
enterprise in exploitation, we seldom reap the
full benefit of them. We are too flank-conscious,
we over-insure administratively, we are by nature
too apprehensive of failure and our training
makes us more so. 14

Application of the Pigeau/ McCann model to
the Simonds-Kitching command relationship
reveals t h a t the c o m m a n d a n d control
framework established by Simonds created an
environment in which Kitching, as a divisional
commander, actually had little in the way of
command authority over how his division was
employed in Normandy. The Simonds' command
paradigm focused on controlling the command
creativity of his divisional c o m m a n d e r s .
Competency, authority and responsibility were
not b a l a n c e d ; as a r e s u l t , effective
"commandership" on the part of the divisional
commanders was impossible. By giving his
commanders detailed instructions down to
brigade level and sometimes below, Simonds
minimized the authority of the divisional
commanders. There was little or no room for
initiative or flexibility from his subordinate
commanders on the battlefield. Kitching was the
divisional commander with the corresponding
legal authority and responsibility, but he was
never allowed to exercise freely his ability or
skills in command. The key component was
Kitching's lack of actual command authority.
The detailed p l a n s of "Totalize" a n d
"Tractable," followed by the tasking of divisions
by Montgomery and brigades by Simonds in the
Falaise Gap battles, are clear examples of
Montgomery a n d S i m o n d s u s u r p i n g the
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commonly understood authority of the divisional
commander. This problem constitutes the core
of the compromised command environment.
Kitching was literally forced to the sidelines; his
only function was to convey the continuing
stream of conflicting orders from Simonds who
was personally struggling to cope with a type of
battlefield he could not handle. This fact is made
clear in a telling s u m m a r y of a series of
conversations between Simonds and the Chief
of Staff 1st Canadian Army, Brigadier Churchill
Mann, recorded in the 1st Canadian Army
Operations Log Group between 1040 hours and
1140 hours on 19 August. During the course of
these conversations, Simonds stated that he was

A Sherman tank of the 4th Canadian Armoured
Division near Cintheaux, France, 8 August 1944.

about to leave for a meeting with his divisional
commanders, but he did not have a clear idea
as to how he should operate "during today and
in the immediate future." Mann endeavoured to
obtain direction from Crerar or Montgomery.
The Chief of Staff 21st Army Group stated that
he had not been in touch with Montgomery, but
that in his opinion, the instructions would direct
2nd Canadian Corps to continue to close the Gap
and keep it closed until 2nd British Army was
able to take over the task. 15 It is evident that
despite his tactical genius, Simonds was having
difficulty orchestrating 2nd Canadian Corps'
response to the fluid and confusing nature of
the Falaise Gap battles. This difficulty also
explains the nature of the constantly changing
orders issued by Simonds.

5
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The p r o b l e m w a s t h a t Kitching, not
Simonds, was charged with responsibility and
authority to command 4th Canadian Armoured
Division. Pigeau and McCann argue that without
such authority, a commander is powerless to
properly accomplish the mission, yet can feel
responsible for not having done so. Without
sufficient authority, commanders are seriously
compromised in their missions, and worse, the
individuals filling the command positions are
at a tremendous psychological disadvantage. 16
There is no doubt that Kitching knew he had to
succeed and felt the psychological pressure to
do so. His answer to this pressure was to drive
himself harder which drove him into a state of
physical and mental exhaustion.

deprivation becomes important in the analysis
of Kitching and helps to explain, in part, a
number of anomalies in his actions during the
closing of the Falaise Gap.
Studies carried out during simulated
armoured and mechanized infantry operations
at the US National Training Center (NTC) in the
Mojave desert of Southern California involving
battalion-sized task forces, and consisting of 14
days of force-on-force and live-fire exercises
observed that sleep was brief and fragmented.
Notable in this study was the clear correlation
between sleep and rank. Whereas personnel at
the squad and crew level averaged between 7-8
hours of sleep each night, those at battalion and
Photo by Ken Bell, NAC PA 1136'

Tanks of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division preparing to advance nearTilly-la-Campagne, 8 August 1944.

The combat/operational environment is
demanding, both physically and mentally.
Commanders, to be effective, m u s t grasp
complex, rapidly evolving, and often ambiguous
situations and react to them. While a commander
has an obligation towards the welfare of those
under his command, there is also the obligation
to look after his own well-being in order to
ensure his performance in combat; it comprises
the interplay between command responsibility
and personal responsibility. Command failure
will result in unit failure, wounded, dead, and
for the survivors the possibility of long term
physical and mental disability. A new area of
research dealing with these issues is evolving,
entitled self-care. Self-care, ranges from
changing one's socks through ensuring that one
gets adequate amounts of sleep which helps
sustain an individual and hence unit
effectiveness in o p e r a t i o n a l s e t t i n g s . 1 7
Understanding the effects of sleep and sleep

brigade level averaged little more than 4 hours
of sleep each night. From the perspective of sleep
and its effects on performance, it would be
expected that personnel at the lower echelons
would be more effective than individuals in the
higher echelons. The study confirmed this
prediction. Junior personnel improved their
performance over the course of the exercise, with
the more senior, higher echelon personnel
entering into a state known as "droning."18 The
tests revealed that the higher the echelon of
command and control, the greater the sleep
deprivation. Accumulated data has shown that
7-8 hours of sleep per night is required to sustain
high levels of performance over days and weeks.
The problem is that continuous combat is
characterized by brief, fragmented sleep, which
h a s little or no recuperative value. This
realization accounts for the common practice of
routinely rotating combat units out of the line
into rest areas.

10
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The tests also revealed that
sleep deprivation (SD) in the
higher echelons of command
and control was greatest in the
force-on-force phase, the most
realistic simulation of combat.
The ability to perform a simple
task (i.e. to lay cross-hairs on
a target and squeeze rounds
off accurately) remained intact
but the ability to perform more
complex cognitive (thinking)
operations, and t h u s to be
oriented to and have a grasp
of the tactical situation was
lost.19 Recent findings reveal
that sleep deprivation impairs
mood, alertness, and cognitive
performance and in general
degrades complex cognitive
performance. Laboratory
studies have revealed that
mental work declines by as
much as 25% during each
s u c c e s s i v e 24 h o u r s of
continuous wakefulness. The
C a n a d i a n Forces m a n u a l
Command states that after 18
hours of sustained operations,
logical reasoning degrades by
30%; after 48 hours it degrades
by
60%. 2 0 While
the
p e r c e n t a g e s vary slightly
between studies, research has
proven t h a t if, d u r i n g a
prolonged crisis, key decisionmakers remain awake beyond
24 hours, then it is reasonably
clear that despite their best
efforts to perform well, their
decision-making ability will
become impaired. 21
Despite the scarcity of
studies concerning executivetype decision-making following
sleep deprivation, Yvonne Harrison and James
A. Home, in one of the most thorough reviews
of sleep deprivation research, have highlighted
several areas for concern. 22 These include
impaired language and communication skills,
lack of innovation, inflexibility of thought
processes, inappropriate attention to peripheral
concerns or distraction, over-reliance on

previous strategies, unwillingness to try out
novel strategies, unreliable memory for when
events occurred, change in mood including loss
of empathy with colleagues and the inability to
deal with surprise and the unexpected. The
impact of sleep deprivation on behaviour is likely
to be significant in a situation that changes
rapidly when personnel have to adapt to a wide
11
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Old foes meet again in Normandy, 1990: Oberst (ret'd) Hubert Meyer, first general staff officer of 12th SS
Panzer Division (left); Major-General (ret'd) George Kitching (centre); and Air Vice-Marshal (ret'd) James Edgar
(Johnnie) Johnson, commander of Canadian Wing of 83 Group, RAF (right).

range of c o n t i n u o u s a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e
developments. Tasks that demand other than
well-learned automatic responses will be most
vulnerable. They also found indirect evidence
of a greater willingness to take risks with
increasing fatigue. There are clear behavioural
consequences related to sleep loss with major
decrements occurring in cognitive processes.
After 54 hours of sleep loss, subjects had a
m a r k e d difficulty m a i n t a i n i n g efficient
performance levels on cognitive tasks with higher
mood and performance degradation. 23 From the
time 4th Canadian Armoured Division went into
battle for the first time as a formation on 8
August until Kitching was removed from
command on 21 August (14 days), the unit was
in continuous combat operations for all except
3 days. Even with those 3 days out of the line
re-equipping and preparing for "Tractable," the
unit suffered from German mortar and artillery
fire. Adequate, uninterrupted sleep was almost
impossible.
As the Falaise Gap battle dragged on, faced
with massive casualties, constantly changing
orders, and a broken command system under
him, Kitching descended a slippery slope into
sleep deprivation. In fact, Kitching states that
for the first three days of "Tractable" and the
Falaise Gap battles, he did not even have a bed.24
Not sleeping further reduced his effectiveness
to command, to the point where by 20 August,
he was exhibiting the clinically recorded effects
12
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss4/2

of someone suffering from 54 or more hours of
sleep deprivation. His actions on 20 and 21
August are consistent with someone suffering
from prolonged sleep deprivation.
In their book Battle Exhaustion, Terry Copp
and Bill McAndrew have provided extensive
research into the numbers and impact that
psychiatric casualties had on 1st Canadian
Army. These were very real casualties but
c a s u a l t i e s w h i c h S i m o n d s refused t o
acknowledge. Simonds would never have
accepted exhaustion as an excuse for poor
performance from one of his commanders since,
as Dominick Graham states, he expected his
commanders to drive themselves as hard as
Simonds drove himself. Unfortunately, Kitching
and probably the other 2nd Canadian Corps
divisional c o m m a n d e r s could not avail
themselves of the eight hours of uninterrupted
sleep that Simonds insisted upon each night.
The brief hours of sleep that Kitching probably
took would not have been sufficient to sustain
him, thereby reducing his ability to command
effectively during the 16-21 August timeframe.
Recent research has begun to question the
effectiveness of Montgomery and Simonds in
Normandy. A key component of this research is
the debilitating effect that the detailed plans
issued by both of these commanders had on the
conduct of the Normandy campaign. Both Bill
McAndrew and Roman Jarymowycz cite
8
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Simonds' lack of a r m o u r e d training and
experience as the cause for the failure to get to
Falaise. In spite of Simonds' glowing reputation
as the best Canadian general of the Second World
War, his command decisions in Normandy and
p a r t i c u l a r l y Falaise m u s t be criticized.
Depending on two weakened, inexperienced
armoured divisions to plug the escape routes of
over 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 G e r m a n s o l d i e r s w a s a n
unrealistic expectation and militarily unsound.
Bradley refused to send three divisions into the
Gap because he felt they would be overrun. At
the same time, Bradley felt that he needed three
divisions simply to guard the American side of
the Gap. 25 Much is made of the fact that
Montgomery did not reinforce the Canadians
with units from 2nd British Army. However, the
opposite side of that argument is that there is
no evidence that Simonds asked for any more
units. In previous battles when he asked for
additional help, he always received it.
Did Kitching have the correct set of
competencies to command an armoured division
in Normandy or from the model perspective, was
he on the Balanced Command Envelope? The
answer can only be no. Kitching, from a
professional military educational perspective,
had the courses necessary for higher command
in the Canadian Army. Unlike many of his
Canadian counterparts, he had attended the

British Royal Military College in Sandhurst in
1929 and in 1940 he attended the Staff College
in Camberly for 6 months. His rapid rise through
the ranks was extraordinary. Kitching joined the
Royal Canadian Regiment as a 2nd lieutenant
in 1939. By 1943, he was commanding an
infantry brigade in Italy and by February 1944,
he was a major-general in command of an
armoured division without any further formal
education or training. By modern standards, this
rise through the ranks represents a fantastic
accomplishment, but in the rapid expansion of
the Canadian Army in the Second World War was
not uncommon.
Kitching had no previous armoured training
or armoured command experience. He was an
infantry officer. While it was not uncommon to
have armoured divisions commanded by officers
from other branches, Simonds made a conscious
decision to appoint Kitching to command 4th
Canadian Armoured Division. Simonds must
have felt Kitching capable of c o m m a n d ;
otherwise, he would not have made the
appointment. With the reality of expanding the
peacetime Canadian Army into a wartime footing
it would be surprising whether any senior
officers would have been placed on the Balanced
Command Envelope. Within 2nd Canadian
Corps, the infantry divisional commanders
would have been better placed within the

The Break Through, near Perrieres, Normandy by Will Ogilvie.
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opponents. 26 John Marteinson argues that the
Balanced Command Envelope since they were
Canadian Military History, Vol. 11 [2002], Iss. 4, Art. 2
problems that had occurred in 4th Canadian
infantry officers, in command of infantry
Armoured Division since its introduction on the
divisions and had held commands of smaller
battlefield were, in large measure, the fault of
Infantry formations earlier in their careers.
Simonds routinely making last-minute changes
Kitching did not have this advantage. Where
to plans to which battle-inexperienced units
Kitching was different from many of his
could not react quickly. 27 The 4th Canadian
contemporaries is in the amount of combatArmoured Division never h a d the s a m e
related experience that he gained while fighting
opportunity, as did 5th Canadian Armoured
and working with Simonds in Sicily and Italy.
Division in Italy, of being able to reflect on its
Even with his unique combination of education
operational performance in its first battles and
and experience, Kitching was outside the
carry out a deliberate training programme to
preferred Balanced Command Envelope for the
correct apparent faults. Once the Poles and
commander of an armoured division.
Canadians were launched into the maelstrom
of the Gap, there was little Simonds or Kitching
The respective positions on Kitching's
seemed able to do to help. Like the remnants of
dismissal provide some very interesting insights.
20 shattered German divisions, Canadian and
When considering the Simonds' position,
Polish tank regiments and infantry battalions
Graham claims that Simonds was too trusting
were destined to fight their own desperate
when it came to his subordinates and friends
battles. 28 There is no doubt, however, that during
because he was inexperienced as an armoured
the actions in the Falaise Gap commanders at
commander. By August, he h a d become
all levels learned quickly from their first combat
hardened and demanded that the men under
experiences and showed far better practical
his command should drive their subordinates
application of all-arms co-operation tactics than
in his own impersonal, objective manner.
in previous battles.
Graham states that Simonds sacked Kitching
because he felt Kitching lacked this hardness.
Graham further states that in Normandy,
Kitching states in his book that under the
Simonds demonstrated intolerance for weakness
circumstances he did not think that anyone else
in his subordinates and their units whether from
could have done much better with the division
heavy casualties, inexperience, fatigue, bad
than he did. He also states that it was unrealistic
weather, or unforeseen and changing orders.
for Simonds to expect him to swing his
Graham presents an interesting list that seems
armoured division around in the enclosed
to be targeted specifically at Kitching since it
countryside of Normandy in the same way that
conveniently dismisses the factors he put
the British 8th Army had when Kitching and
forward in defence of his actions. It is interesting
Simonds had observed these units in the
to note that Graham skirts the entire issue of
desert. 29 The changing orders and casualties,
Simonds' performance during the closing of the
combined with the breakdown of communication
Falaise Gap, arguably one of the most critical
and the inexperience of battle, were key factors
and highly debated battles in Canadian military
that greatly affected the division's ability to
history, by only dedicating one page to it.
function in the first two battles. 30 Even though
casualties severely crippled the armoured
brigade,
Kitching and many contemporary
This sense that Kitching was not "tough
authors
felt
that the individual regiments fought
enough" comes out often in the literature. Had
well
under
adverse
conditions and without firm
Kitching been more ruthless, would he have
direction.
This
belief
is consistent for "Tractable"
received more out of the troops? The answer is
and
in
the
closing
of
the Falaise Gap.
not so clear-cut. The 4th Canadian Armoured
Division was a green division learning its trade
in an unforgiving environment; it was forced to
Roy claims that Kitching lost his command
fight at a disadvantage in both terrain and
because "the promise he showed failed to
weapons. The terrain favoured the German
materialize" and he "failed to exercise the
defenders and their anti-tank weapons; 4th
requisite grip, which can only come from
Canadian Armoured Division tank crews were
personal supervision." Simonds' A.D.C. related
also at a technological disadvantage when the
the following to Professor Roy:
Sherman tanks are compared to their German
14
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...Shortly afterwards General Simonds told me
what he had done...and that it was the most
difficult thing he had ever had to do; that he had
tremendous confidence in him because of their
close association in Sicily and Italy and almost
loved him as he would a brother, and admired
his great courage and personal ability; that he
found it impossible to understand how things
in the 4th Armoured had got so out of control.
He felt he had no other choice than to replace
him; that lives were at stake and he could take
no more chances. 31

Had Kitching lost control and, if not, why
would Simonds think that he had? The question
as to why and how Simonds developed his
impression of Kitching is not readily available
from Simonds himself. Kitching states that he
rarely saw any staff officers from 2nd Canadian
Corps at his headquarters. This assertion
suggests that Simonds would have formed his
opinion on Kitching through direct observation
or through contact with 4th Canadian Armoured
Division units.
Within this context, a series of scattered but
recorded incidents involving Simonds and
Kitching or units of 4th Canadian Armoured
Division probably formed the basis for Simonds'
perception that Kitching had lost control. There
is a series of six incidents recorded between 7
and 20 August that individually do not create a
picture of someone who had lost control.

However, when put together with the added
weight of the anxiety over the fact that 4th
Canadian Armoured Division was the lead unit
of the 2nd Canadian Corps attack and it was
taking so long to close the Gap, one could
understand how Simonds may have formed his
opinion. Kitching, in his taped interviews, spoke
of the enormous pressure that was being brought
down on him from Simonds and Montgomery
to close the gap. The pressure to succeed was
tremendous. But the basic question remains:
what more might have been accomplished, given
the c o m m a n d environment, the enemy's
superior battle experience, their distinctive
advantages in both armour and anti-tank
weapons and the tremendous problems that
Kitching experienced in his first series of battles?
The incident that probably sealed Kitching's
fate as General Officer Commanding 4th
Canadian Armoured Division occurred on the
evening of 20 August. Simonds once again
changed the orders of 4th Canadian Armoured
Division and ordered 4th Canadian Armoured
Brigade to go rescue the Poles. As far as Kitching
was concerned, the new orders did not make
any sense and he told Simonds so. Kitching
responded: "To hell with them. They have run
out of food and ammunition because of the
inefficiency of their organization; our people have
been fighting just as hard but we have managed
15
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A Polish trooper sits on his Cromwell tank.

to keep up our supply system." That was about
as far as Kitching got b e c a u s e Simonds
peremptorily ordered 4th Canadian Armoured
Brigade to rescue the Poles immediately.32 This
outburst at Simonds' orders to help the Poles
was totally uncharacteristic for Kitching.
Unfortunately, what Kitching probably did not
know was that Simonds was with elements of
the Polish division when the orders were issued.
Kitching was naturally very shocked and
emotionally upset at the decision to relieve him
and made a number of points in his defence.
The first involved the long delay in sending
Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Moncel to command the
armoured brigade. He also complained that the
division had had too many changes in orders
over a period of ten days and had taken very
heavy casualties in commanders, soldiers, and
tanks in its first battles. It is interesting to note,
according to Kitching, that Simonds had no
rebuttal for either of these points. 33
The issue with Moncel is perhaps the most
crucial. During the early stages of phase 2 of
"Totalize" (8 August), Kitching and Simonds had
a discussion as to who would replace Brigadier

Leslie Booth, commander of 4th Canadian
Armoured Brigade, if he should be injured. They
agreed on Moncel who at that time was a member
of Simonds' staff at 2nd Canadian Corps.
Kitching knew Moncel quite well. When Kitching
was informed of the injuries to Booth on 14
August, he immediately asked for Moncel.
Unfortunately, and for reasons not clearly
explained, Moncel did not take command of 4th
Canadian Armoured Brigade until the afternoon
of 19 August. The delayed arrival of Moncel
forced Kitching to rob his armoured regiments
of their commanders to provide a commander
for the armoured brigade. Kitching's most
talented armoured regimental commander was
Lieutenant-Colonel D. Worthington, but he had
been killed in "Totalize." Kitching was left with
Scott, Halpenny, and Wotherspoon. Kitching's
s e c o n d choice was W o t h e r s p o o n , the
commander of the South Alberta Regiment.
Kitching talked to Brigadier Jim Jefferson,
commander of 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade,
about the possibility of promoting Wotherspoon,
but Jefferson would not hear of it. Jefferson
argued that it would be fatal to the regiment and
would upset the whole brigade because of the
familiarity that had been built up among the
regiment and squadron commanders. 34 What
was not said at that point was that Jefferson
relied heavily on the tactical expertise of
Wotherspoon and Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart,
c o m m a n d i n g the Argyll a n d S u n d e r l a n d
Highlanders of Canada in the handling of that
brigade. It is not clear whether Kitching already
knew this about Jefferson but it could help
explain why he accepted Jefferson's arguments
so easily and settled on Moncel.
Why did it take five days for Moncel to get to
4th Canadian Armoured Brigade when he was
physically no more than two hours away?
Unfortunately, this question may never be
properly answered and is crucial in the dismissal
of Kitching. It seems peculiar that the 2nd
Canadian Corps diarist felt compelled to make
an entry in the 2nd Canadian Corps war diary
on 17 August to say that Moncel was taking over
4th Canadian Armoured Brigade.35 Kitching's
r e q u e s t h a d obviously gone to Corps
Headquarters but why a three day delay in the
notation and why did it take a further two days
for him to get to 4th Canadian Armoured
Brigade? The frustrating fact is that Moncel

16
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proved to be an effective brigade commander
who could have provided the needed leadership
to the armoured regiments on the critical day of
15 August. The replacements that Kitching was
forced to use proved incapable, for various
reasons, of handling the job.
Despite arguments to the contrary, casualties
within the division were a significant factor in
its performance. A typical regiment, both
armoured and infantry, had 38 officers.36 Of the
officers that began the month of August in the
armoured regiments of 4th Canadian Armoured
Division, the Governor General's Foot Guards
had suffered 50% casualties, the Canadian
Grenadier Guards 42%, the British Columbia
Regiment 58%, and the South Alberta Regiment
40% casualties. On average, 48% of the original
officer complements were casualties by 26
August or after 14 days of combat. These
casualties caused a leadership vacuum that was
compounded by the robbing of the regimental
c o m m a n d e r s to c o m m a n d the a r m o u r e d
brigade. The worst case was the decimation of
the British Columbia Regiment where the unit
lost its commanding officer, adjutant, all
squadron commanders and rear link captains,
six lieutenants and 101 other ranks, and 47
tanks all in one day of combat, 9 August. 37 At
one point, during the advance to Trun, the
Canadian Grenadier Guards were commanded
by a captain. Even more compelling was the loss
of senior officers (major and lieutenant-colonel)
in the armoured brigade. The casualty rate at
these r a n k s was 56%, with the brigade
Photo by H.G.
Aikman, NAC
PA 131265

commander and two of the three regimental
commanding officers killed.38
Casualties among the other r a n k s are
another telling statistic. A typical armoured
regiment had an established strength of 657
other ranks, while an infantry regiment had 811.
On 15 August, even after receiving its portion of
reinforcements the 4th Canadian Armoured
Division w a s s h o r t 5 0 9 g e n e r a l d u t y
infantryman. 39 This number represented almost
an entire regiment. By 26 August, the armoured
regiments were m a n n e d at 85% of their
established strength and the infantry regiments
at 74%. It is interesting to note that a typical
German division of 12,000 men was considered
used up when its ration strength was reduced
to 11,000 men or reduced by roughly 10%. Part
of the rationale for this figure is that the
casualties were primarily in the fighting echelons
of the division and not in the support troops. 40
If the same criterion is applied to 4th Canadian
Armoured Division, the division would have been
considered used up by 12 August.
It is i n t e r e s t i n g to c o m p a r e t h e
accomplishments of 4th Canadian Armoured
Division during the closing of the Falaise Gap
with the efforts of the veteran British 7th
Armoured Division during the same time frame.
Early on 17 August, 7th Armoured Division
passed through 51st Division with orders to
exploit success by a drive on the Seine River, 65
miles away. The division took three days to travel
nine miles to the town of Livarot, which was

Canadian tanks of 4th Canadian Armoured Division move into battle south of Robertmesnil, 14 August 1944.
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found empty, against opposition that was
described as slight, consisting of small rear
parties. The division took another four days to
travel to the town of Lisieux another nine miles
away against little or no opposition.41 This effort
must be compared with the intense combat that
4th Canadian Armoured Division was embroiled
i n a r o u n d T r u n a n d C h a m b o i s . Rapid
exploitation of the collapsing German position
elsewhere may have relieved pressure on 2nd
Canadian Corps. Bradley steadfastly refused to
send his three divisions into the cauldron
around Chambois until late in the battle. There,
in the middle of the Falaise Gap, stood the
decimated units of 4th Canadian Armoured
Division. Not only did they have to deal with
Germans attacking from all sides and thousands
of surrendering Germans, they also had to
rescue the Poles.42 Before rendering any realistic
assessment of success or failure, the actions of
all units must certainly be compared and placed
into context.
The 4th Canadian Armoured Division had
led the way in the August battles, but as a new
division it had to learn its business as it fought.
The division gained valuable experience and so
did its commander.43 Unfortunately, Kitching was
never allowed to exercise freely command of his
division. Pigeau and McCann argue that there
have been adequate commanders in history who
have shared the same set of traits as their more
successful counterparts, but who were less
successful because of extenuating circumstances
such as resources limitations, personnel
differences and adversary competence. There
has also been a tendency to judge those who had
not attained greatness as somehow deficient in
their personal traits and skills, when the
deficiency, in fact, may not be the case.
Within the three dimensions of influence of
the P i g e a u / M c C a n n model ( a u t h o r i t y ,
competency and responsibility), Kitching was
both competent and accepted the requisite
responsibility. Kitching h a d no previous
a r m o u r e d experience, b u t few C a n a d i a n
armoured units were commanded by armoured
officers at the time. Kitching did have valuable
combat experience from Italy and Sicily and was
probably as competent as any other officer to
command 4th Canadian Armoured Division once
Simonds decided he did not want Worthington.

Kitching was left to shoulder the blame for
the perceived poor Canadian performance in
Normandy; yet, the blame was not his to hold.
Kitching certainly did fail. He failed to look after
himself and as a result his performance suffered.
But, if Kitching failed 4th Canadian Armoured
Division, Simonds failed Kitching. It was a failure
on Simonds' part to not provide Kitching with
the resources he needed to accomplish his
mission. Moncel arriving to command 4th
Canadian Armoured Brigade on 15 August could
have had a profound effect on Kitching's
command and the tactical battle by
re-establishing the framework of command
within the division. Effective leadership for 4th
Canadian Armoured Brigade on that date might
have put 4th Canadian Armoured Division in
Trun much earlier, thereby closing the Gap
before the German order to withdraw had been
given. Regardless, the opportunity to end the
Normandy campaign early with a sweeping
victory had been lost on that fateful morning of
8 August. What ensued afterward was a display
of ineffective senior Canadian leadership in a
wasteful slugging match that should have never
happened and went far beyond the sphere of
influence of only one divisional commander. It
can be argued that the lacklustre showing of the
Canadian army in Normandy for June and July
rests with the Canadian divisional commanders,
but the same cannot be said for the battles of
August. The blame for the August battles must
rest squarely with Simonds. Given the command
environment and unfolding circumstances of the
August 1944 battles, Major-General George
Kitching and the 4th Canadian Armoured
Division performed much better than they have
ever been given credit for. In the end, Kitching
was an able commander placed in an almost
impossible situation.
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